MULLINS_FMT5.DOC

5/1/2009 4:25:27 PM

THE CLEAN WATER INITIATIVES
AND THE PROPER BALANCE
BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO BALLOT
INITIATIVES AND THE
PROHIBITION ON APPROPRIATIONS
BY TIMOTHY J. MULLINS*
ABSTRACT
The Alaska Constitution grants its citizens the right to ballot initiatives,
but the right is limited: initiatives may not “make or repeal appropriations.”
To determine whether a proposed initiative is an appropriation, Alaska courts
use a two-step test that determines, first, whether an initiative deals with a
state asset and, second, whether the initiative involves a giveaway or would
strip the legislature of its control over state assets. This test is incomplete,
however, because it does not properly consider Article XI, sections 4 and 6 of
the Alaska Constitution, which give the legislature a strong check on the
initiative process. The Author proposes a test that would limit the finding of
giveaways to situations in which the voters themselves materially benefit
from an initiative. The test would hold an initiative unconstitutional when it
permanently robs the legislature of its discretion over state assets. The Author
then applies this new test in a case study utilizing the recent Clean Water
Initiatives.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 26, 2008, Alaska voters went to the polls and rejected
Ballot Measure 4, known as the Clean Water Initiative, by a resounding
margin. The vote marked the end of an intense legal and political
struggle that began more than a year earlier and has resulted in at least a
temporary victory for supporters of Pebble Mine. This vote has been so
well-publicized both in Alaska and on a national level1 that, at first
glance, there appears to be little left to discuss. However, the saga of the
Clean Water Initiative confronted issues that transcend Pebble Mine and

1. See, e.g., William Yardley, Vote in Alaska Puts Question: Gold or Fish?,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2008; Elizabeth Bluemink, Pebble Blog, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, http://community.adn.com/adn/blog/61223 (last visited Mar. 28, 2009)
(chronicling ADN’s Pebble coverage).
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strike at the very heart of the right of Alaskans to sponsor and pursue
ballot initiatives. In the aftermath of this struggle, it is important to focus
on the principles at stake and not merely on the outcome.
Although ballot initiatives are enshrined in the Alaska
Constitution, citizens are explicitly prohibited from using the ballot
initiative to make appropriations.2 Though the meaning of
“appropriation” is not defined by the constitution, the Alaska Supreme
Court has developed an approach to the term that has increasingly
restricted the right. Relying on these decisions, the Alaska Attorney
General rejected two earlier anti-Pebble initiatives before certifying the
third attempt. The litigation that followed appeared to set the stage for
the next major decision by the supreme court regarding the contours of
the appropriation prohibition. However, shortly before oral argument,
the sponsors withdrew the first attempted initiative (Clean Water I)
from consideration, leaving the court with the decision of affirming the
relatively uncontroversial decision on the third initiative (Clean Water
III). One possibility for the withdrawal of Clean Water I was that
supporters thought the court would strike down Clean Water I, thereby
hurting Clean Water III’s chances. If so, this concern was well-founded
since, under the current test employed by the supreme court, it is likely
that Clean Water I would be an appropriation.
However, focusing too much on what would happen under the
current test obscures the real issue: does that test reflect a correct
interpretation of the appropriation prohibition? This Note will argue
that the current test does not fully take into account the relationship
between the initiative process and the legislature that was envisioned by
the text of the Alaska Constitution and the expressed intent of the
framers. Part I will provide a brief background on Alaskan ballot
initiative law. Part II will summarize the controversy over Pebble Mine
and the Clean Water Initiatives. Part III will turn to the development of
the doctrine regarding appropriations, and Part IV will identify key
constitutional issues overlooked by the current test. Part V will apply
these concepts to the current test and, in the process, develop an
alternative test that better reflects the text and purpose of the
constitution. Finally, Part VI will display the differences between the
current and proposed tests by applying them to Clean Water I.

2. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7.
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I. BACKGROUND: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE IN ALASKA
The citizen’s right to ballot initiatives is found in article XI, section
1 of the Alaska Constitution.3 Alaskans have taken advantage of this
right throughout their history and have passed initiatives on a wide
range of issues, including hunting and fishing, English as the state’s
official language, and medical marijuana.4 Section 7 prohibits initiatives
that make appropriations, dedicate revenues, create or define the
jurisdiction of the courts, prescribe the rules of the courts, or enact local
or special legislation.5 The legislature is heavily involved in the process
and has the power to preempt an initiative by passing a substantially
similar law before the initiative is voted on.6 It may also repeal any
initiative after two years, or amend it at any time.7
The initiative process begins with an application to the Lieutenant
Governor,8 who, within sixty days, will either certify the initiative or
announce the grounds for its denial, which are limited to problems of
form or constitutionality—particularly whether it violates the Section 7
prohibitions.9 If denied, the only recourse is to redraft the initiative in
compliance with the Lieutenant Governor’s request or challenge the
denial through the courts.10
If certified, the sponsors prepare a petition to circulate throughout
the state.11 Within one year of certification the petition must include
signatures from a number of voters equal to at least 10% of those who
voted in the preceding general election, including 7% of voters in at least
three-fourths of the state house districts who voted in the preceding
elections.12 If the petition drive is successful and certified by the
3. ALASKA CONST. art. XI § 1.
4. See Alaska Division of Elections, Initiatives That Have Been on Alaska’s
Ballots, http://ltgov.state.ak.us/elections/initbal.php (last visited Mar. 28,
2009).
5. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7.
6. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.210 (2008).
7. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6.
8. The application includes the proposed bill, the bill’s title, and the
signature of 100 voters as sponsors, three of whom are designated as the
initiative committee. ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.45.030–.040 (2008).
9. ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.45.070–.080 (2008).
10. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 2.
11. The petition must contain, among other things, the proposed bill, an
impartial summary of the bill, the estimated cost of the bill, and a statement of
warning that knowingly signing the same bill more than once is a misdemeanor.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.45.090–.100 (2008). The petition’s circulator must be an
Alaska resident and may not be paid more than one dollar per signature, nor
may any voter be paid to either sign or refrain from signing a petition. ALASKA
STAT. §§ 15.45.105–.110 (2008).
12. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.140 (2008).
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Lieutenant Governor, the initiative will be placed on the ballot of the
first statewide election held after filing and 120 days after the
adjournment of the previous legislative session.13 A successful initiative
becomes effective within 90 days of the election.14

II. THE BATTLE OVER THE CLEAN WATER INITIATIVES
Although the Clean Water Initiatives and Pebble Mine have
received wide attention, they are worth discussing here to serve as a
refresher and to highlight some of the legal background that has not
garnered as much media attention.
A. Background on Pebble Mine
The history of Pebble Mine began in 1986 when Cominco, a major
mining corporation, first began exploration of the area that would
become known as Pebble Mine, leading to the discovery of the Pebble
West deposit in 1988.15 By 1992, however, Cominco had essentially
abandoned the project, and in 2001, its option to the area was acquired
by Northern Dynasty Mining (NDM).16 Subsequently, on July 31, 2007,
NDM joined with Anglo American17 to form Pebble Partnership, a fiftyfifty partnership to develop Pebble Mine.18 The other companies with
interest in Pebble Partnership are Rio Tinto, which currently owns

13. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.190 (2008).
14. ALASKA STAT. § 15.45.220 (2008).
15. See N. Dynasty Minerals Ltd., The Pebble Project: The Future of U.S.
Mining & Metals, http://www.northerndynastyminerals.com/ndm/Pebble.asp
(last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
16. Id. NDM is a mining company based out of Vancouver, Canada and is a
part of the Hunter Dickinson group of companies, a larger organization that
deals with various natural resource development projects. See N. Dynasty
Minerals, Ltd., Corporate Profile, http://www.northerndynasty.com/ndm/
CorporateProfile.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2009). NDM appears to exist solely for
the development of Pebble Mine. See id.
17. Anglo American, based in London, England, is one of the largest mining
companies in the world, with annual gross revenues of $35.7 billion and over
190,000 employees worldwide. See Anglo American, About Us: At a Glance,
http://www.angloamerican.co.uk/aa/about/ataglance/ (last visited Mar. 28,
2009).
18. See
Pebble
Partnership,
Overview
and
History,
http://
www.pebblepartnership.com/pages/project-information/project-overview.php
(last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
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nearly 20% percent of NDM,19 and Mitsubishi, which acquired a 9.1%
stake in NDM on February 16, 2008.20
In early 2005, NDM claimed that Pebble West contained 4.1 billion
tons of resources, including 42.1 million ounces of gold, 24.6 billion
pounds of copper, and 1.4 billion tons of molybdenum and additional
silver.21 In September of that year, NDM announced the discovery of
Pebble East, which was, at the time, believed to contain an additional
42.6 billion pounds of copper, 39.6 million ounces of gold and 2.7 billion
pounds of molybdenum.22 According to NDM, the combined haul from
these two sites would make Pebble Mine the second largest copper
porphyry mine in the world, just behind a mine in Indonesia.23
Shortly thereafter, NDM began the permitting process by applying
to the Alaska Department of Natural Resources.24 Although the exact
details of the project have not been released, Pebble Partnership
currently claims that the mine will create two thousand jobs for two to
three years during the construction phase and one thousand high-skill
jobs during an expected fifty- to eighty-year operation period.25
Additionally, the Partnership claims that the mine will lead to hundreds
of millions of dollars in annual state and local tax revenue, as well as
capital expenditures of three to four billion dollars.26 The mine will also
require a considerable amount of infrastructure, including hundreds of
miles of roads and pipelines and at least two large dams.27

19. See
Pebble
Partnership,
Company
Overview,
http://
www.pebblepartnership.com/pages/about-the-pebble-partnership/companyoverview.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
20. See Mitsubishi Becomes Stakeholder in Pebble, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb.
16, 2008, available at http://www.adn.com/money/industries/mining/
story/316778.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
21. See Pebble Partnership, Overview and History, supra note 18.
22. Mary Pemberton, Pebble Mine Prospect Keeps Getting Richer, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 13, 2007, available at http://dwb.adn.com/money/
industries/mining/pebble/story/9376024p-9289321c.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2009).
23. See id.
24. See
Pebble
Partnership,
Regulatory
Review,
http://www.
pebblepartnership.com/pages/project-information/regulatory-review.php (last
visited Mar. 28, 2009).
25. See Pebble Partnership, Jobs and Business Opportunities: Overview,
http://pebblepartnership.com/pages/jobs-business-opportunities/
opportunities.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
26. Id.
27. See
Pebble
Partnership,
Road,
Port
&
Power,
http://
pebblepartnership.com/pages/project-information/road-port-power.php (last
visited Mar. 28, 2009) (providing details on roads and pipelines).
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Opposition to Pebble Mine

Organized opposition to Pebble Mine began to develop in 2005 and
included the Renewable Resources Coalition (RRC), a group formed in
June 2005 in part to thwart the development of Pebble Mine.28
Opponents of the mine have typically focused their attacks on the
potential harm the mine may cause to the salmon population of the
Bristol Bay drainage.29 Bristol Bay is home to one of the world’s largest
salmon populations and the largest population of sockeye salmon.30
Commercial fishing in the area produces millions of dollars in revenue
for Alaska fishermen.31 The great fear of the salmon fishers is that, due
to Pebble Mine’s location on the headwaters of the Kvichak and
Nushagak rivers, the mine will poison the water, release various toxins,
and irreparably damage the Bristol Bay fishery.32
The Alaska legislature also began to respond. First, on January 26,
2007, Senate Bill 67 was put forward by Sen. Gary Stevens of Kodiak.33 If
passed, Senate Bill 67 would designate a significant portion of Pebble
Mine to be the Jay Hammond State Park, effectively ending the
development of the mine, but without affecting any other mining
prospects in the state.34 However, this bill has never left committee, and
there has been no other recent activity, suggesting that the legislature, if
it decides to act, will not do so via Senate Bill 67.35 House Bill 134 was
introduced by Bryce Edgmon of Dillingham on February 14, 2007 and
would, if enacted, prohibit certain conduct with water and greatly limit
the potential development of Pebble Mine.36 This bill, like its Senate
counterpart, has also languished in committee, but may have received
new life on February 27, 2008, when a modified version of the bill was

28. See Renewable Resources Coalition, About Us, http://www.
renewableresourcescoalition.org/about_us.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2009).
29. See, e.g., Geoffrey Parker et al., Pebble Mine: Fish, Minerals, And Testing the
Limits of Alaska’s “Large Mine Permitting Process,” 25 ALR 1 (2008), 17–21 (arguing
that Pebble Mine would likely have negative effects on Bristol Bay salmon
population).
30. Id. at 7.
31. See id. at 6–9 (describing the Bristol Bay fishing economy).
32. See id. at 17–21.
33. See Alaska Senate Bipartisan Working Group, Available Data for SB67,
http://www.aksenate.org/index.php?bill=SB.067 (last visited Mar. 12, 2009).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Margaret Bauman, Pebble Backers Say Fish Refuge Bill Actually Targets
Mine, ALASKA J. COM., Feb. 25, 2007, available at http://www.alaskajournal
.com/stories/022507/hom_20070225034.shtml.
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approved by the House Special Committee on Fisheries and sent to the
House Resources Committee.37
C.

The Initiatives

The struggle over the Clean Water Initiatives began when
opponents of Pebble Mine attempted to certify the first Clean Water
Initiative (“Clean Water I”), on April 25, 2007.38 This initiative sets out
five broad prohibitions and restrictions that relate to large-scale mining.
First, mines are prohibited from releasing “any toxic pollutant”39 into
water that is used by either humans or salmon.40 Second, specific
substances including cyanide and sulfuric acid are prohibited from
being used in watersheds that could lead to direct, indirect, or
cumulative harm to either humans or salmon.41 Third, the initiative
prohibits the storage or disposal of metallic mineral wastes and tailings
that generate sulfuric acid or dissolved metals.42 Fourth, the storage or
disposal of metallic mineral wastes and tailings is prohibited within one
thousand feet of any body of water used by humans for drinking or by
salmon. Fifth, any activity that causes acid mine drainage is also
prohibited.43 Finally, the initiative makes clear that it only applies to
new mines and does not affect pre-existing large-scale mines.44 The
Alaska Attorney General’s office rejected this initiative because it was
found to be an appropriation, particularly the first prohibition, because
it would likely preclude mining operations and would therefore
interfere with the legislature’s “power to allocate resources amongst
competing uses.”45 In doing so, the Attorney General rejected the
contention of the initiative’s sponsors that it merely contained additional

37. See Alaska’s House Democratic Caucus, HB 134, http://
www.akdemocrats.org/index.php?bill=HB134#data, (last visited Mar. 12, 2009)
(providing information on bill including current status).
38. See Review of 07WATR Initiative Application, Office of the Attorney
General of Alaska, 2007 Alas. AG LEXIS 10, *1 (Alaska June 21, 2007).
39. This is broadly defined to include any substance that causes “death,
disease, malignancy, behavioral abnormalities, or malfunctions in growth,
development, behavior or reproduction, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological
malfunctions or physical or physiological abnormalities.” Id. at *2.
40. Id.
41. Id. at *3.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *3–4.
45. Id. at *32.

MULLINS_FMT5.DOC

2009

5/1/2009 4:25:27 PM

CLEAN WATER INITIATIVES

143

regulations.46 This decision was challenged by the sponsors and was the
primary subject of both superior court opinions discussed below.47
A second Clean Water Initiative, Clean Water II, was sent to the
Lieutenant Governor on July 30, 2007 as an attempt to eliminate the
concerns over appropriations.48 This initiative was also rejected by the
Alaska Attorney General as being an appropriation.49 The differences
between this initiative and Clean Water I appear to be related more to
form than substance. The five prohibitions were cast as three standards
that could not be infringed by any activity associated with a large-scale
mining operation.50 The Attorney General rejected this initiative because
it was found to be beyond mere regulations and was actually an
allocation of water.51 The sponsors have not challenged this decision and
Clean Water II is no longer relevant to the struggle over Pebble Mine.
Finally, a third Clean Water Initiative (“Clean Water III”) was sent
to the Lieutenant Governor on October 9, 2007.52 This time, the Attorney
General certified the initiative.53 The Clean Water III initiative describes
itself as “regulatory standards affecting streams and waters” and
requires large-scale mines to comply with two standards.54 The Attorney
General certified Clean Water III because the initiative only prohibited
the discharge of waste and pollutants that are harmful, rather than
prohibiting the discharge of all waste or pollutants.55 This decision was
challenged by proponents of Pebble Mine.56

46. Id. at *28.
47. See infra Part II.D.
48. See Review of 07WTR2 Initiative Application, Office of the Attorney
General of Alaska, 2007 Alas. AG LEXIS 25 (Alaska Sept. 27, 2007).
49. Id. at *1–2.
50. Id. at *2–3. These standards are: first, toxic pollutants may not be issued
into water “that will effect [sic] human health or welfare or any stage of the life
cycle of salmon”; second, cyanide or sulfuric acid may not be released into any
watershed used by humans or salmon; third, metallic mineral wastes and
tailings may not be stored or disposed in a way that could release sulfuric acid
or other harmful agents into water used by humans or salmon. Id. at *4–5.
51. Id. at *28.
52. See Review of 07WTR3 Initiative Application, Office of the Attorney
General of Alaska, 2007 Alas. AG LEXIS 26 (Alaska Oct. 17, 2007).
53. Id. at *28–30.
54. Id. at *1. These standards are: first, the release of any toxic pollutant “in a
measurable amount that will effect [sic] human health or welfare or any stage of
the life cycle of salmon” into water is prohibited; second, the storage or disposal
of mining wastes or tailings that could release sulfuric acid or other toxic
pollutants that will affect water used by humans or salmon is also prohibited. Id.
at *4–5.
55. Id. at *28–30.
56. See infra Part II.D.

MULLINS_FMT5.DOC

144

5/1/2009 4:25:27 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 26:1

D. The Conflicting Superior Court Opinions
Following the Attorney General’s decisions, there were two
superior court opinions concerning Clean Water I that went in
completely opposite directions.
The first opinion57 was issued by Judge Fred Torrissi of the Third
Judicial District at Dillingham on October 12, 2007. The court held that
the initiative was not an appropriation and characterized the parties as
differing “by only one part per billion, or less,”58 due to the State’s
admission at oral argument that if miners could release less than one
part per billion of arsenic as opposed to none, the initiative “sounded
like a regulation.”59 The court found that, if passed, the initiative would
ban all new large-scale mining for the foreseeable future.60 The court
struggled with the question of whether Clean Water I was an
appropriation, admitting that, “[t]he answer does not leap out at us.”61
After deeply analyzing the supreme court jurisprudence discussed in
detail below, the court concluded that the initiative was not an
unconstitutional appropriation because Clean Water I did not designate
property for a particular use, but rather prohibited property from one
particular use and thus did not “bind the legislature’s hands or require
disposition of state property.”62
The second opinion63 was issued by Judge Douglas Blankenship of
the Fourth Judicial District at Fairbanks on February 28, 2008. In contrast
with the Dillingham opinion, the court held that Clean Water I was an
unconstitutional appropriation.64 The court began by assuming that
since Clean Water I prohibited the release of “any pollutant
whatsoever,” the initiative would have effectively banned large-scale
mining for the foreseeable future.65 After reviewing the case law, the
court held that the initiative “reduces the government’s discretion over
allocation of water use and appeals to the self-interest of users of salmon
57. Holman v. Parnell, No. 3DI-07-56 (Alaska Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2007),
available at http://www.ltgov.state.ak.us/PDFs/07WATR-SummaryJudgment.
pdf.
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 10.
62. Id. at 16–17. The court also dismissed a separation of powers claim by the
state because “the people aren’t a branch of government, and we don’t construe
the constitution to protect us from ourselves.” Id. at 17.
63. Council of Alaska Producers v. Parnell, No. 4FA-07-2696 (Alaska Super.
Ct. Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.ltgov.state.ak.us/PDFs/07WATRFairbanksSuperiorCourt.PDF.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 13.
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and people currently using drinking water.”66 The initiative, therefore,
“essentially attempts to appropriate water only to human drinking
water and salmon.”67 In the view of this court, the legislature must be
able to “retain discretion to allocate public assets such as water to all
uses.”68
E.

The Supreme Court Litigation and the Vote

Following the conflicting superior court opinions, both sides
appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, which heard oral arguments in
the case on June 18, 2008. Before oral arguments, however, the sponsors
decided to withdraw Clean Water I,69 and the court was left with only
the issue of whether Clean Water III was an unconstitutional
appropriation. On July 3, 2008, the supreme court released an order that
upheld the constitutionality of Clean Water III.70 The order is a brief
three pages and neither lists its author nor mentions if any justices
dissented.71 Nevertheless, the order makes clear the validity of Clean
Water III and affirms the relevant part of the Fairbanks opinion; a full
opinion is expected in the future.72 Following the order, Clean Water III
was placed on the ballot.73
Finally, Clean Water III, now called Ballot Measure 4, was
considered in the August 26, 2008, primary and was soundly defeated,
with roughly fifty-eight percent of voters opposing the initiative.74
Supporters of the initiative blamed the defeat on the massive amount of
money spent by pro-mining groups, as well as the influence of Governor
Sarah Palin’s public announcement that she would vote “No.”75

66. Id. at 19.
67. Id. at 20.
68. Id. The court further held that Clean Water III was not an appropriation
because it only prohibited discharge that would have had an adverse impact,
and therefore allowed large-scale mines to operate if they did so cleanly. See id.
at 21. Moreover, Clean Water III did not set aside any state assets and left it to
the legislature to determine the meaning of “adverse.” See id. at 23.
69. See Elizabeth Bluemink, Court Dismisses Anti-Pebble Initiative, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, June 9, 2008, available at http://community.adn.com/adn/
node/124949.
70. See Pebble Ltd. P’ship v. Parnell, 187 P.3d 478 (Alaska 2008).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See Mary Pemberton, Alaska Voters Decide Mining Over Fish, AP, Aug. 27,
2008, available at http://www.newsvine.com/_news/2008/08/27/1791232alaska-voters-decide-mining-over-fish.
75. See Mary Pemberton, Measure 4 Supporters Regroup, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 28, 2008, at A3.
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However, initiative opponents countered that the lack of clarity about
the initiative was a major reason for its defeat.76

III. THE LEGAL EVOLUTION OF THE APPROPRIATION
PROHIBITION
The Alaska constitution provides that “[t]he people may propose
and enact laws by the initiative;”77 however, the initiative may not be
used to, among other things, “make or repeal appropriations.”78 The
current test to determine whether an initiative is an appropriation is a
two-step inquiry. First, an initiative must deal with a state asset.79
Second, if an initiative does deal with a state asset,80 the court
determines whether it is an appropriation.81 To perform the second step,
the court considers whether an initiative clashes with either of the two
primary purposes of the restriction: preventing giveaways of state assets
and retaining the legislature’s discretion regarding the disposition of
state assets among competing uses.82
This test appears nowhere in the state constitution nor was it
proposed by any of the framers. Rather, the current test was crafted by
the Alaska Supreme Court through a series of significant decisions.
Initially, the prohibition was arguably only implicated in initiatives that
concerned the appropriation of state money. However, the court
dispensed with that view in Bailey v. Warren, a 1979 decision holding
that an appropriation occurred when there was a giveaway of stateowned land.83 This decision was extended in 1987 to include giveaways
of all other state assets in Alaska Conservative Political Action Committee
(“ACPAC”) v. Municipality of Anchorage.84 The second purpose of the test
was added in McAlpine v. University of Alaska,85 a 1988 decision in which
the court first held that an appropriation would be found when an

76. Id.
77. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1.
78. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7.
79. See, e.g., Alaska Conservative Political Action Comm. v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 745 P.2d 936, 938 (Alaska 1987).
80.Courts had typically interpreted the term “state asset” quite broadly. See
Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage, 151 P.3d 418,
422–23 (Alaska 2007) (explaining that public revenue, land, municipally owned
utilities, and wild salmon were all found to be state assets); but see id. at 424
(holding that taxi permits were not state assets).
81. Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform, 151 P.3d at 423.
82. See, e.g., id.
83. See Bailey v. Warren, 595 P.2d 1, 7–8 (Alaska 1979).
84. 745 P.2d at 938.
85. 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).
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initiative interfered with the legislature’s discretion86 by “set[ting] aside
a certain specified amount of money or property for a specific purpose
or object in such manner that is executable, mandatory, and reasonably
definite with no further discretion.”87
The test, therefore, was formalized by the late 1980s. Two major
developments subsequent to McAlpine have resulted in a considerably
broader interpretation of the prohibition than had previously existed,
without adding any new factors. The first of these developments was the
1996 decision in Pullen v. Ulmer, in which the court seemed to stretch to
find an appropriation in an initiative that, on its face, was not
necessarily one. Although this decision is arguably correct, it should, in
the very least, be viewed as the outermost boundary of the prohibition.
The court’s decision in Alaska Action Center, the second development,
was inappropriate because the initiative at issue did not truly rob the
legislature of its discretion over the state asset.88
These two decisions have created a regime where the power of the
initiative to pass important legislation may be curtailed. At a certain
level, it seems reasonable to imagine that any initiative could interfere
with legislative discretion. To a certain extent, that is the point of the
right to the ballot initiative Alaska has conferred on its citizens; without
it, the legislature would be the only body able to make laws.
The court, therefore, must seek a proper balance of the right89 and
the restriction,90 while giving full effect to both. Additionally, the court
must also take into account article XI, sections 491 and 692 of the Alaska
Constitution. These two provisions create a complicated interaction
between citizens and the legislature that makes clear the shortcomings
of the current test and has, unfortunately, been ignored by the supreme
court.
The following sections elaborate on the evolution of the doctrine
and discuss the pivotal decisions in greater detail.

86. See id. at 88.
87. City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau, 818 P.2d
1153, 1157 (Alaska 1991) (reaffirming rule in McAlpine).
88. See Alaska Action Center, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989,
994 (Alaska 2007).
89. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 1.
90. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 7.
91. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 4 (providing the legislature with the power to
eliminate a pending initiative if it passes a substantially similar piece of
legislation before the initiative is voted on).
92. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6 (providing the legislature with the authority to
overturn an initiative two years after enactment and amend the passed initiative
at any time).
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A. Bailey and ACPAC: Beyond Money
The supreme court first expanded the definition of appropriation to
include situations beyond the appropriation of money in Bailey v.
Warren.93 The initiative at issue was the Alaska Homestead Act, which
would have made available a total of thirty million acres of state lands to
residents who fulfilled several minimal requirements.94 In interpreting
the constitution, the court explained that the issue should be interpreted
based on the “the language of section 7 construed in light of the purpose
of the provision.”95
The court held that “appropriations” was an ambiguous term and
could mean state assets beyond money.96 Next, looking to the purposes
behind the enactment of the provision to determine if the initiative at
issue was an appropriation, the court held that “[t]he delegates wanted
to prohibit the initiative process from being used to enact give-away
programs, which have an inherent popular appeal, that would endanger
the state treasury.”97 This holding was based on the framers’ general
concern about abusing the initiative process and specific concerns
regarding initiatives that dealt with appropriations.98 The general
concern was expressed in several ways; for example, the framers
reduced the time an initiative could not be repealed from three years to
two and allowed for the initiative to be amended by the legislature at
any time.99 Also, the restrictions were seen as a “compromise designed
to reserve basic authorities to the people while protecting the state

93. 595 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1979).
94. See id. at 2 (including such requirements as filing an application, showing
proof of residency, and paying a one hundred dollar filing fee).
95. Id. at 4. The court further elaborated on its constitutional theory and
explained that it was “especially sensitive to the policy concerns embodied in
constitutional provisions because a constitution is a document unchangeable by
ordinary means” that “must be considered as a living document adaptable to
changing conditions and circumstances unanticipated at the time it was
written.” See id. (internal citations omitted).
96. Id. at 6–7. In doing so, the court also addressed a somewhat strange event
in the legislative history. An earlier draft of the provision had proposed to
include the phrase “of public funds” after “appropriations;” however, it was
defeated, partly because the constitution’s framers deemed it to be unnecessary.
See id. at 6–7. The court dismissed any possible argument that this would limit
appropriations to money by explaining that, since “public funds” was just as
ambiguous as “appropriations,” there was no need to revisit its earlier holding.
See id. at 7.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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against rash, discriminatory, and irresponsible acts.”100 Initiatives
dealing with appropriations were viewed as especially susceptible to
“rash, discriminatory, and irresponsible acts,” and the restriction was
adopted in part to curtail the bad experiences of states without a similar
restriction.101 This concern was particularly strong regarding a giveaway
that “tempt[s] the voter to [prefer] . . . his immediate financial welfare at
the expense of vital government activities.”102 Accordingly, a massive
giveaway of land is an appropriation just as much as a massive
giveaway of money, since both rob the state of major assets and present
the voters with the same type of temptation.103
The supreme court expanded appropriations to cover all state
assets in Alaska Conservative Political Action Committee v. Municipality of
Anchorage.104 There, the initiative required Anchorage to sell its
municipally–owned power company for one dollar.105 This constituted
an appropriation because it was exactly the type of “rash,
discriminatory, and irresponsible act” the prohibition was intended to
limit.106 However, the court failed to address the fact that, though
perhaps rash and a bad policy decision, the individuals who voted for
this initiative would not materially benefit from the initiative as they
would have in Bailey.
Bailey and its extension in ACPAC have served as the bedrock for
all subsequent decisions.107 Bailey also contains a detailed look at the

100. Id. (quoting VICTOR FISCHER, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 80–
81 (1975)).
101. Id. For example, the court quoted one delegate who explained that
without a restriction on appropriations, organized interest groups would create
initiatives that took the power of “making of revenue measures and expenditure
of the funds away from the legislature,” which could possibly bankrupt the
state. See id. at 7–8 (further describing initiatives that did serious harm to
California, Colorado, and Washington).
102. Id. at 8.
103. Id. at 9. This decision, however, was not unanimous. First, Justices
Rabinowitz and Matthews concurred in the judgment and holding on
appropriations, but would have invalidated the initiative based on its violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Alaska Constitution because the initiative
would have infringed on individuals’ rights to travel and make their homes in
Alaska. See id. at 9 (Rabinowitz, J., & Matthews, J., concurring). Justice Connor
dissented and argued that the court should not have expanded the definition of
appropriations beyond set-asides of money because, based on his reading of the
constitutional history, that was the framers’ motivating concern. See id. at 19
(Connor, J., dissenting).
104. 745 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1987).
105. Id. at 936.
106. Id. at 938.
107. See, e.g., Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 59 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Bailey,
595 P.2d at 9).
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intent of the framers to determine whether the initiative should be
considered an appropriation.108 However, the court has not followed this
lead, instead focusing exclusively on other supreme court decisions.
Thus, in a sense, Bailey has become unmoored from its firm
constitutional grounding and now stands solely for the proposition that
a giveaway of a state asset is an appropriation.
B.

McAlpine: Beyond Giveaways

Nine years after Bailey, the court in McAlpine v. University of
Alaska109 first held that an initiative may not interfere with the
legislature’s discretion over state assets.110 The initiative at issue dealt
with an attempt to reorganize the administration of the state university
and college system to create a separate community college system.111
The second and third sentences of the initiative were of particular
concern,112 and the supreme court held that only the third sentence was
an appropriation.113
In deciding to invalidate the third sentence, the court expanded the
definition of “appropriation” to include “appropriations of state assets,
regardless of whether the initiative would enact a give-away program or
simply designate the use of the assets.”114 The court explained that,
“[t]he reason for prohibiting appropriations by initiative is to ensure
that the legislature, and only the legislature, retains control over the
allocation of state assets among competing needs.”115 Under this
definition, the third sentence was an unconstitutional appropriation
because it “specifie[d] the amount of assets to be designated for
community colleges . . . [and] no further legislative action would be
108. See Bailey, 595 P.2d at 68.
109. 762 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988).
110. See id. at 91 (holding further that offending clauses could be severed from
initiatives).
111. Id. In the past, the system was organized into five administrative units,
with one unit specifically dealing with the community college system; however,
the system was reorganized into three geographically-based units in December
1986 and community colleges were administered based on locality. See id. at 82–
83.
112. These sentences read: “The University of Alaska shall transfer to the
Community College of Alaska such real and personal property as is necessary to
the independent operation and maintenance of the Community College System.
The amount of property transferred shall be commensurate with that occupied
and operated by the Community Colleges on November 1, 1986.” Id. at 83.
113. See id. at 89.
114. Id. at 89.
115. Id. at 88 (emphasis in original) (holding further that the initiative could
still go to the voters because the unconstitutional third sentence could be
severed from the constitutional second sentence). Id. at 93.
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necessary to require the University to transfer . . . or to specify the
amount of property the University must transfer.”116 In contrast, the
second sentence was not an appropriation because, by not requiring a
specific amount of resources, the legislature still had sufficient discretion
regarding the funding of community colleges.117
The rule in McAlpine was reaffirmed in City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks
Convention and Visitors Bureau.118 Before the initiative, seventy percent of
the bed tax revenue in Fairbanks went to the Convention and Visitors
Bureau.119 The initiative aimed to remove this restriction and greatly
expand the purposes for which the revenues could be used.120 The court
explicitly stated that an appropriation exists if an initiative conflicts with
the two purposes of the prohibition.121 In deciding whether the second
purpose was implicated, the court explained that an initiative would be
considered an appropriation when it “set aside a certain specified
amount of money or property for a specific purpose or object in such
manner that is executable, mandatory, and reasonably definite with no
further discretion.”122
Holding that the initiative was constitutional, the court refrained
from invalidating it merely because it was “arguably an
appropriation.”123 The court explained that “the purposes of the
constitution are not met by construing the term ‘appropriations’ broadly
in the context of an initiative which arguably repeals an
appropriation.”124 Additionally, “[t]he purpose of the prohibition . . . is
to ensure that the legislative body remains in control of and responsible
for the budget”125 and that a broad interpretation of appropriation is not
necessary in contexts that “[do] not disempower the legislative body
from making annual spending decisions.”126 Although made in the
context of an initiative alleged to have repealed an appropriation, these
statements show that the court should always consider the purposes of
the prohibition.

116. Id. at 91.
117. Id. The court further found that an offending clause could be severed
from an initiative if the new form retains the primary purpose of the initiative
and is still a law and not merely a broad policy statement. Id. at 95.
118. 818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991).
119. Id. at 1154.
120. Id. at 1155.
121. Id. at 1156 (quoting McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 88).
122. Id. at 1157.
123. Id. at 1156–57.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1157.
126. Id.
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Over time, McAlpine has become the major case when considering
whether an initiative is an appropriation because it is the first case
where the dual purposes of the second step are stated, albeit indirectly.
However, McAlpine does not contain the type of thorough constitutional
analysis found in Bailey and begins the somewhat troubling reification of
the doctrine that culminates with Alaska Action Center.
C.

Pullen: Stretching to Find an Appropriation

The next major decision regarding appropriations was Pullen v.
Ulmer.127 This case is important not because it provides an additional
factor or step, but rather because the court appears to have stretched the
test to find an appropriation. The challenged initiative provided that
subsistence, personal use, and sport fisheries would receive preference
in apportioning the salmon harvest before the remaining harvest would
be available to other users.128 The portion was limited to five percent of
the total statewide harvest, but that limit could be exceeded for any
particular species or region.129 The Lieutenant Governor certified the
initiative and the superior court held that the initiative was not an
appropriation.130
The supreme court disagreed and held that the initiative was an
appropriation because it violated both purposes of the constitutional
prohibition.131 First, the initiative was a giveaway because it appealed to
the immediate self-interest of sport, personal, and subsistence fishers.132
According to the court, this “tempt[s] the voter to [prefer] . . . his
immediate financial welfare at the expense of vital government

127. 923 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1996).
128. Id. at 55.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 56–57. According to the superior court, the initiative merely created
a “new system of preference among beneficial users of the statewide salmon
harvest” that required further action by the Board of Fisheries to determine how
much salmon each group was entitled to, thus preserving the Board’s “broad
discretion” to make allocations. Id. at 57, n.7.
131. Id. at 63–64. Before discussing whether there was an appropriation, the
court first held that salmon were a state asset even though “the state does not
own wildlife in precisely the same way that it owns ordinary property.” Id. at 59.
Rather, salmon, and wildlife in general, were state assets due to the benefit the
state gained from wildlife in the form of increased tourism, business taxes, and
hunting fees, and the constitutional importance of fish. Id. at 59–60. Public assets
such as fish were deemed to be “held in trust for the benefit of all of the people
of the state,” giving the state the authority to regulate and control their numbers.
Id. at 60–61.
132. Id. at 61.
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activities” in the same way as the massive land giveaway in Bailey.133
The initiative also violated the prohibition’s second purpose since the
initiative “significantly reduces the legislature’s and Board of Fisheries’
control of and discretion over allocation decisions, particularly in the
event of stock-specific or region-specific shortages of salmon between
the competing needs of users.”134 The court was primarily concerned
about how the initiative would work during times of shortages and
reasoned that the Fairness in Salmon Harvest (FISH) initiative could
possibly result in the closure of some commercial fisheries.135
Accordingly, the initiative called for an actual allocation of resources
that removed a considerable amount of discretion from either the
legislature or the Board.136 The court explained that this conclusion
accorded with the principle expressed in McAlpine: that an
appropriation exists if the initiative sets aside a specific amount of
property for a specific purpose, by holding that the initiative would
require the Board to adhere to the initiative and that legislative freedom
is not retained in shortages.137
D. Alaska Action Center: Crossing the Line
The supreme court followed Pullen by further expanding the
definition of appropriation in Alaska Action Center, Inc. v. Municipality of
Anchorage138 when the court found that an initiative that would have
retained the state’s ownership of an asset was nevertheless an
appropriation because it interfered with the legislature’s discretion.139
The proposed initiative would have dedicated 730 acres in Girdwood
that was owned by the Municipality of Anchorage to be a public park,
although the municipality was in the midst of developing the land into a
private golf course.140
The court analyzed the case under the second purpose of the
prohibition.141 In comparing the initiative to that in McAlpine, the court

133. Id. at 63. The court does not address how this applies to voters who
would not benefit from the legislation, nor does it define how the initiative
would necessarily harm “vital government activities.” Id.
134. Id. at 63.
135. Id. at 64. The court’s focus on shortages is odd because the term does not
appear anywhere in the initiative, which deals with how the harvest should be
dealt with on all occasions.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 64 n.15.
138. 84 P.3d 989 (Alaska 2004).
139. Id. at 994.
140. Id. at 990.
141. Id. at 994.
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emphasized that both initiatives designated specific amounts of
property to be used for specific assets, even though the state retained
ownership of the asset.142 Thus, by telling the legislature what it must do
with a specific piece of property, the initiative “encroache[d] on the
legislative branch’s exclusive control over the allocation of state assets
among competing needs.”143 The court explained that “by limiting the
mechanism for future change to another initiative process, the
initiative’s dedication requirement necessarily intrudes on the
legislature’s control over future designation.”144 However, this ignores
the ability of the legislature to overturn initiatives after two years.145
Thus, even assuming the court was correct that the initiative robs the
legislature of its discretion, this alleged theft would only be for two
years.
E.

Turning Back from the Edge?

Although the court considerably expanded the prohibition in Pullen
and Alaska Action Center, there may be reason to believe that the court
has stepped back from an ever-expanding definition of “appropriation.”
First, in Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage,146 the supreme court
held that an initiative requiring Anchorage to sell the municipal power
company for market value or to the highest bidder was an appropriation
because, by usurping the legislature’s resource allocation role, the
initiative interfered with the second purpose of the constitutional
prohibition.147 In his concurrence, Justice Matthews attempted to “dispel
any possible conclusion that the court’s broad interpretation of the term
‘appropriations’ prohibits any substantive lawmaking by initiative that
properly should be within the initiative power.”148 Matthews made clear
that it was not the objective of the initiative that was the problem, but
rather the requirement that Anchorage sell tangible property.149
Accordingly, Matthews suggests that an initiative would be proper if it
were to “directly prohibit the Municipality from, after a certain date,

142. Id.
143. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
144. Id. at 994–95.
145. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6.
146. 139 P.3d 1259 (Alaska 2006).
147. Id. at 1260–63. This was somewhat similar to the initiative in ACPAC,
which required the municipality to sell the power company for one dollar. See
Alaska Conservative Political Action Comm. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 745
P.2d 936, 936 (Alaska 1987).
148. Staudenmaier, 139 P.3d at 1265 (Matthews, J., concurring).
149. Id.
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selling or distributing electricity.”150 Matthews concluded by explaining
that, “laws effecting substantial changes in policy can be made by
initiative, but when they create surplus property, the disposition of such
property is a matter for the representative lawmaking body.”151
Next, the supreme court limited the definition of state asset in
Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage.152 The case
concerned an initiative that would have required the municipality to
issue taxicab permits to any qualified applicant who paid the
administrative fee.153 The court held that the permits were not state
assets because they did not authorize a holder to take a public resource
and because the purpose of the permit was to regulate the industry for
public safety.154 Justice Carpeneti dissented and argued that the majority
mischaracterized the nature of the asset.155 Under Carpeneti’s analysis,
the permit allows drivers to use the roads, a public resource, for private
gain, and, since the administrative fee is well below the fair market
value of a permit before the initiative, the initiative was essentially a
giveaway.156

IV. THE PROCEDURAL INTERACTION BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE
AND BALLOT INITIATIVES
The general tendency of the Alaska Supreme Court has therefore
been to adopt an increasingly broader view of what constitutes an
appropriation. However, the supreme court has never truly taken into
account the impact of sections 4 and 6 of article XI of the Alaska
Constitution on the proper balance between the right to initiative and
the appropriation prohibition.157 This is an error since all provisions of
the constitution should be given effect. Additionally, these provisions
are part of the general regulation of ballot initiatives and are necessary
to fully understand the intention of the framers. Sections 4 and 6 are
especially important in this regard because they show that the
constitution envisions a dynamic relationship between citizens and the
legislature in the ballot initiative process. The supreme court should

150. Id.
151. Id. at 1266.
152. 151 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2006).
153. Id. at 420.
154. Id. at 423–24.
155. Id. at 427 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. In fact, the only time these provisions were ever mentioned was in Bailey,
where the power of the legislature to overturn initiatives was mentioned briefly.
See Bailey v. Warren, 595 P.2d 1, 7 (Alaska 1979).
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therefore give full effect to these provisions when deciding whether an
initiative is an appropriation.
First, article XI, section 4 of the Alaska Constitution allows the
legislature to preempt an initiative by passing a substantially similar bill
before the election.158 Although it is not entirely clear when a legislative
act is “substantially the same” as an initiative, it is clear that the
legislature has the power to void a pending initiative through
legislation. Thus, the constitution supports an important and often
overlooked aspect of the initiative: the power to spur legislative action
over issues that the legislature, for whatever reason, either ignores or
has not chosen to address. This appears to be happening to a certain
degree regarding Pebble Mine, since there has been action in both the
House and Senate, although nothing definitive has been done.159
Additionally, this power is especially useful for issues that have
potentially broad support among the populace, but may cut against the
grain of traditional partisan alliances. Pullen provides a good example
since the initiative had the potential to create a coalition of traditionally
conservative rural voters and anti-big business liberal voters.160 This
coalition makes it possible that, if the issue had been allowed to go on
the ballot, the legislature would have been prompted to reach some sort
of consensus.
Section 6 gives the Alaska Legislature the power to amend passed
initiatives at any time and repeal initiatives after two years.161 The
power to repeal allows the legislature to eliminate initiatives that prove
to be unpopular or are simply bad policy after a relatively brief period of
time. To be sure, this does not help in pure giveaways of state resources
such as in Bailey,162 but it would allow the legislature to overturn the
park in Alaska Action Center,163 as well as to overturn the restrictions in
the Clean Water Initiatives164 if the legislature decides that large-scale
mining in general, and Pebble in particular, are better uses of the
resources. Thus, this two-year window acts as experimental time for the
initiative and allows for proponents of the initiative to develop the

158. In relevant part, section 4 states that, “If, before the election, substantially
the same measure has been enacted, the petition is void.” ALASKA CONST. art. XI,
§ 4; see also ALASKA STAT. §15.45.210 (2008) (codifying provision).
159. See supra Part II.B (explaining ongoing legislative actions).
160. Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 55 (Alaska 1996).
161. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6.
162. See Bailey, 595 P.2d at 2.
163. See Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989,
991 (Alaska 2004).
164. See Review of 07WATR Initiative Application, Office of the Attorney
General of Alaska, 2007 Alas. AG LEXIS 10, *1 (Alaska June 21, 2007).
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necessary support to hold a legislative majority. Additionally, by giving
the legislature the power to amend an initiative, the constitution
acknowledges that initiatives may not be perfect when passed and may
require legislative amendment. Although one could debate the
definitions of “amending” and “repealing,” it is clear that the legislature
maintains the power to change an initiative that needs to be modified
and, after two years, the greater power to repeal an initiative that has
lost political support.165
Taken together, article XI, sections 4 and 6 demonstrate the
complicated interaction between citizens and the legislature in the
creation and maintenance of ballot initiatives. Citizens have the right to
sponsor and pass initiatives, but an initiative may be superseded by the
legislature either before or after its passage. This creates a system where
legislative will acts as a strong democratic check on the impact of
initiatives that either have only a passing popularity or are not ideal for
reaching popular goals. The courts should be hesitant to interfere with
this constitutionally created dynamic; rather, they should allow the
design to play itself out in the public arena. By not allowing for such
development, a court created regime will fail to properly balance the
rights created in section 1, the prohibitions of section 7, and the citizenlegislature interactions of sections 4 and 6.

V. DEVELOPING A PROPER TEST
In any effective test, the Alaska Supreme Court must take into
account the complex back-and-forth between the legislature and the
citizens envisioned by the framers of the Alaska Constitution and
enshrined in sections 4 and 6. In order to reach that goal, this Part will
propose an amended test that keeps the same overall structure of the
current test but has the following changes: first, the court should
determine whether an initiative directly deals with a state asset; second, a
giveaway should only be found when the voters themselves benefit from
the initiative and not when a third-party is the beneficiary; third, the
second purpose should only be implicated when the initiative robs the
legislature of its discretion when it permanently disposes of the asset or
involves some other irreversible action.166

165. See ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6.
166. This final reform was suggested in an email exchange between the
Author and Geoffrey Parker. Email from Geoffrey Parker, Attorney, Law Office
of Geoffrey Parker, to Tim Mullins, Executive Editor, Alaska Law Review (Apr.
14, 2008).
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A. The First Step: Defining a State Asset
Under the current test, a court must decide whether an initiative
deals with a state asset.167 This step has been broadly interpreted to
include a variety of assets well beyond money, including land, salmon,
and public utility companies.168 However, it raises one potential
objection169 and two further considerations. The current test should be
improved by determining that an appropriation only exists when an
initiative directly deals with a state asset; further, courts should carefully
consider how they define the state asset at issue since this will have
major implications on step two.
First, it is potentially objectionable to include non-monetary assets
as state assets. Under this regime, the power of the initiative would
increase and voters would be further empowered because any nonmonetary initiatives would be permitted. However, the court correctly
decided against this approach. The state owns many assets beyond
money and allowing groups to deplete the state treasury by robbing it of
non-monetary assets seems to be incongruous with a restriction
designed to limit that very power.170 Thus, the fear of “rash,
discriminatory, and irresponsible” acts that animates the restriction is
not limited to money.171 The constitution itself appears to envision a
definition of appropriation that includes more than money since the
restriction on appropriations comes directly before the restriction on
revenues.172
There are two further issues that must be considered. First, a test
must define when an initiative actually deals with a state asset. This is
important because it provides some limit to the reach of the restriction.
For example, an extreme view may lead to the conclusion that anything
tangentially dealing with a state asset, such as an initiative that would
167. See, e.g., Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 151 P.3d 418, 422–23 (Alaska 2006).
168. Id.
169. There exists a secondary objection, which, while not disputing the
importance of the requirement that a state asset be at issue, does raise the issue
of whether it must necessarily be considered as a separate prong. That is, if we,
for now, presuppose that the second step is correct, it may make more sense to
consider whether the initiative deals with a state asset as merely an element of
the test. Although this has some logical appeal, it is, in the end, not worth the
disturbance it will cause because, either way, the court must decide whether
there is a state asset involved at all; moreover, the current view allows for the
court to kill initiatives without having to also go into the analysis of the second
step. See, e.g., id. at 424.
170. See Bailey v. Warren, 595 P.2d 1, 8 (Alaska 1979).
171. Id. at 6–7.
172. See ALASKA CONST. art XI, § 7.
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ban smoking in public parks, could possibly run afoul of the
appropriation restriction. The court dealt with this issue squarely in
Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform, where it refused to find that the taxi
permits were state assets,173 implicitly rejecting the dissent’s argument
that the initiatives dealt with the roads, an obvious state asset.174 At one
level, the dissent is correct because roads are clearly a state asset.
However, this argument is far too attenuated and indirect because the
purpose of the initiative was unrelated to roads and only affected roads
because taxis must drive on them. To prevent this argument from taking
hold, the court should clarify the doctrine by requiring a challenged
initiative to directly deal with a state asset. This would have the
advantage of keeping intact a rather expansive definition of asset, but
would also provide a useful limit to the reach of the prohibition.
The test must also precisely define the asset.175 Although this issue
evades any bright-line rules, two principles will be useful in guiding
courts to reach the correct conclusion. First, in cases where the asset
could be defined in one of several ways, the best approach would be to
look to the underlying purposes and motivations behind the initiative.
For example, in Pullen, the issue was how much salmon each interest
could take in a given year;176 accordingly, the asset should be viewed as
the salmon taken that year and not the overall salmon population. This
has the advantage of preserving the motivating purpose behind the
initiative and allowing for a more complete interaction between citizens
and the legislature.
In many cases, the relevant asset will be money, which can be
defined in at least two different ways: the individual dollars spent or the
general amount necessary to implement the initiative. To resolve this
issue, the court should turn to the specificity of the initiative. Thus, if an
initiative specifies the amount of money that must be spent each year,
then the asset will be the dollars spent. On the other hand, initiatives
that are more general policy statements and do not require a specific
expenditure should be viewed in the latter way: as an implementation
cost.177

173. See Anchorage Citizens for Taxi Reform v. Municipality of Anchorage,
151 P.3d 418, 424 (Alaska 2006).
174. See id. at 427 (Carpeneti, J., dissenting).
175. This issue is extremely important when analyzing whether the initiative
actually robs the legislature of its discretion over the asset. See infra Part V.B.2.
176. Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 55 (Alaska 1996).
177. The further implications of this point will be discussed in Part V.B.2.
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The Second Step: Interfering with the Dual Purposes of the
Restriction

The second step in the current test is ascertaining whether the
initiative interferes with the dual purposes of the restriction on
appropriations: the prevention of giveaways and the preservation of
legislative discretion over state assets. Here, the court closely examines
the initiative to determine what effect the initiative will have on the
relationship between the legislature and the people. This part will make
two key arguments. First, giveaways should only be found in instances
where the voters themselves would benefit from the initiative and not
where the beneficiary would be a third party. Second, the court should
only find that an initiative unconstitutionally interferes with the
legislature’s discretion over state assets when the initiative would
permanently rob the legislature of that discretion.178
1. Giveaways
Under the current test, an initiative may not constitute a giveaway
of state assets.179 This issue raises two questions: Should giveaways be
considered appropriations? If so, when should they be found?
First, giveaways should clearly be considered appropriations. The
court in Bailey makes clear that the framers were very concerned about
initiatives that could bankrupt the state by appealing to voters’ selfinterest.180 This is a major problem because these initiatives present the
voter with a heavily weighted question: should they give themselves

178. A third point concerns whether the dual purpose test is actually required
or whether the test would be better if there were merely one overarching
purpose, i.e., that issues concerning the state treasury should be kept under the
control of the legislature. This argument has some merit. For example, a
giveaway clearly infringes upon the legislature’s discretion over that asset. In
fact, in McAlpine, the court concluded that “the constitutional prohibition against
appropriations by initiative applies to appropriations of state assets, regardless
of whether the initiative would enact a give-away program or simply designate
the use of the assets.” McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 89 (Alaska
1988). Additionally, under the proposed test, the major difference is who is the
beneficiary of the initiative: if the people benefit, there is a giveaway, but if a
third party benefits, it is an interference with the legislature’s discretion.
However, this step is not worth taking. First, it does not add anything to the way
things are currently since courts would still look to see if there is a giveaway, as
that would rob the legislature of its discretion. The change would thus be almost
entirely cosmetic. Second, giveaways are a useful shorthand for initiatives that
are clearly problematic because they go against the clear intent of the framers to
prevent rash and discriminatory acts that appeal solely to voter self-interest.
179. See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention and Visitors Bureau,
818 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Alaska 1991).
180. See Bailey v. Warren, 595 P.2d 1, 7–8 (Alaska 1979).
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something for free or deny themselves that benefit so that the state can
effectively govern? Perhaps at a philosophical level this presents
something of a conundrum, but it may often lead to the rash decisions
specifically condemned by the framers of the Alaska Constitution.181
Moreover, banning giveaways promotes a healthy relationship between
the legislature and the citizens by prohibiting voters from making policy
choices that will materially benefit them. For example, if an initiative
sponsor who wants to incentivize home-ownership could follow the
lead in Bailey and just give away land, the legislature could not amend
or repeal the initiative, and any attempts to preempt it would require
convincing people that free land was bad for them. In contrast, with
giveaways prohibited, the sponsor would have to craft an initiative that
promotes this incentive in some other way that the legislature could
preempt with another bill, amend after passage, or kill following a twoyear wait.
Second, a giveaway should only be found in instances where the
initiative promises a direct benefit to the voters. Once again, Bailey
provides the clearest example of an initiative that meets this test
because, by voting for the initiative, the voters would give themselves a
rather large amount of land.182 These types of giveaways squarely
implicate the framers’ fear that the initiative could lead to “rash,
discriminatory, and irresponsible acts.” However, perhaps due to the
relative clarity of its rule, Bailey is the only decision where the court was
confronted by such an initiative.
In contrast, the court has found giveaways in situations where,
although a state asset was technically given away, the recipient of the
asset was some entity other than the citizens themselves. This was the
case in ACPAC, where the court held that an initiative that would have
sold the public power company to a private company for the trivial price
of one dollar was a giveaway.183 To be sure, this would have given away
a state asset, but it does not appeal to the voters’ self-interest since
voting for privatization benefits the receiving company. This is the
primary justification for the rule and, without voter self-interest being
present, makes finding that an initiative constitutes a giveaway more
difficult. One argument in favor of keeping the rule could be that voters
should not have this type of power and that giving away a state asset,
even to a third party, is simply too reckless to be decided by the voters.

181. See id. at 6–7 (explaining that the framers’ motivation was to prevent
“rash, discriminatory, and irresponsible acts”).
182. See id. at 8.
183. See Alaska Conservative Political Action Comm. v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 745 P.2d 936, 938 (Alaska 1987).
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However, this is distinct from the fears of reckless self-interest
articulated by the framers of the Alaska Constitution.184
Another problem with finding a giveaway in these instances is that
it forces the court to make a quantitative judgment about when an
initiative is a giveaway and when it is merely selling at a low price. In
ACPAC, would there have been a giveaway if the selling price were $100
or $1000? Fortunately, the supreme court essentially answered this
question in Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage, which dealt with
an initiative that would have required the state to sell the power
company for a reasonable price.185 There, the court found that the
initiative was an appropriation because it violated the second purpose
by robbing the legislature of its discretion and requiring the state to take
a specific action with a specific state asset.186 There are problems with
the application of the second purpose, but in this case, that purpose
points to a better solution to ACPAC-like initiatives than fitting them
into the giveaway category.
Left unresolved by this dichotomy are cases like Pullen, where the
initiative confers a direct benefit to some, but not all, citizens.187 These
initiatives, by only appealing to more limited types of self-interest, are
better seen as policy statements; for example, in Pullen, the initiative
seemed to ask citizens to express a general preference for small fishers
over large commercial fishers, which is hardly a “rash, discriminatory,
and irresponsible act” that would bankrupt the state treasury.188
Therefore, initiatives such as this should not be considered giveaways.
Although drawing this line may not always be easy, the court should
always consider the scope of the alleged giveaway, both in terms of who
it will benefit and how large that benefit will be.
2. Interfering with the Legislature’s Discretion
Under the current test, an appropriation exists if the initiative “sets
aside a certain specified amount of money or property for a specific

184. See Bailey, 595 P.2d at 6–7.
185. Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage, 139 P.3d 1259, 1263 (Alaska
2006).
186. See id.
187. The benefit would only have gone to people who fished salmon for
personal, subsistence, or sport uses. See Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 63 (Alaska
1996). Additionally, this alleged benefit may not even exist for a large percentage
of fishers. For example, if the Board of Fisheries decides one year to grant that
year’s permits primarily to subsistence fishers, none of the recreational or sport
fishers would receive a personal benefit from the initiative. Thus, not every
citizen would benefit from the initiative, and it would not be guaranteed that
any benefit would even exist from year to year.
188. See Bailey, 595 P.2d at 7.
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purpose or object in a manner that is executable, mandatory and
reasonably definite with no further legislative action.”189 Similar to
giveaways, this section also revolves around two primary questions:
whether the second purpose should exist at all, and, if so, how far
should it reach? This section will argue that the court was correct to
include this purpose as part of the current test. However, it has been
misapplied in at least one case because the court failed to properly
account for the legislature’s power to amend or repeal an initiative after
passage. Accordingly, this purpose should only be used to invalidate an
initiative when the initiative would permanently remove the legislature’s
discretion over a state asset.
First, McAlpine was correct to include this purpose in the test to
determine whether an initiative is an appropriation.190 The court in
McAlpine turned to dictionaries and the use of “appropriation” in other
legal contexts to conclude that “setting aside funds for a particular
purpose” was an appropriation.191 Therefore, the court did not conduct
the type of thorough constitutional analysis that occurred in Bailey.192
This lack of analysis is somewhat troubling because by not inquiring
into the purpose of the prohibition the court may have expanded the
prohibition to a place it was never intended to go. Nothing in Bailey,
however, precludes this holding. In fact, the speech by Delegate Taylor
quoted in Bailey appears to support applying the restriction to instances
that remove the legislature’s power to designate the use of state assets.193
Finally, the court’s textual analysis is not without merit since the court
correctly asserts that the typical type of legislative appropriation
involves “committing certain public assets to a particular purpose.”194
This purpose, however, must have a limit, or else it has the
potential to swallow the entire rule because, at a certain level of
abstraction, any initiative could interfere with the legislature’s
discretion. For example, an initiative that would lower the state highway
speed limit to fifty-five miles per hour appears to represent a clear
policy preference for reducing traffic speed. However, it would also
require significant expenditures to train police officers and to replace
speed limit signs, thus robbing the legislature of the discretion to use
that money for another purpose. Moreover, other initiatives that initially
appear to be entirely concerned with policy could, on closer inspection,

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Staudenmaier, 139 P.3d at 1262.
See McAlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P.2d 81, 88 (Alaska 1988).
See id.
See Bailey, 595 P.2d at 6–8.
Id. at 7.
McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 88.
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be viewed as appropriations. For example, the recently defeated Clean
Elections Initiatives expressed a clear policy-goal of minimizing political
corruption by providing public funding for state elections.195 However,
this initiative also would have given hundreds of thousands of dollars to
qualifying candidates,196 money which would otherwise have been
spent according to the legislature’s discretion. These policy-based
initiatives are precisely the type of initiatives that invoke the “basic
authorities” of the people and would benefit most from the interaction
between the legislature and the people envisioned by the Alaska
Constitution.
A limiting principle is therefore necessary to protect policy-based
initiatives. The court has held that an appropriation will only be found
when the initiative tells the legislature that it must take a specific action
with a specific asset.197 This principle is what distinguished the two
clauses in McAlpine, since the offending clause mandated that the
legislature spend a specific amount of money, but the unoffending
clause only required that the community college system be administered
independently.198 This distinction is sensible and provides a useful check
on initiatives that are so general that they are clear statements of policy,
such as an initiative that would create an after-school program for all
needy children. Additionally, the specificity requirement fits in clearly
with the above discussion regarding how monetary assets should be
defined.199
However, the specificity requirement is insufficient because it fails
to fully account for the constitutionally-created relationship between the
legislature and the public. Alaska Action Center provides a clear example
of this problem because, by requiring that the specific piece of land be
dedicated as a state park,200 the initiative satisfies that specificity
requirement. The decision is still problematic, however, because the
state retains ownership of the land and the legislature still has the power
to overturn the initiative in two years if it decides that the land could be
put to better use, either as a golf course, as was initially intended, or as

195. See Alaskans for Clean Elections, Why Clean Elections, http://
www.alaskansforcleanelections.org/whyCleanElections.htm (last visited Nov.
18, 2008).
196. See Alaskans for Clean Elections, How Clean Elections Work,
http://www.alaskansforcleanelections.org/howCleanElectionsWork.htm (last
visited Nov. 18, 2008).
197. McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 91.
198. Id. at 91–94.
199. See supra Part III.A.
200. See Alaska Action Ctr., Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 84 P.3d 989,
994 (Alaska 2004).
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something else. The initiative therefore would have allowed voters to
express their policy decision that a piece of public land be kept as a park,
but would not have permanently removed the asset from the
legislature’s discretion.
This situation could be fixed by adding one word to the current
test: an appropriation should only be found when the initiative would
require the legislature to use a specific asset for a specific purpose that
permanently robs the legislature of its discretion over that asset. Under
this test, an initiative that did not permanently strip the legislature of its
discretion would be allowed to go through the entire process created by
the constitution. The legislature would first have the chance to preempt
the initiative by passing a substantially similar act and, since this would
involve a decision that does not involve voter self-interest, the debate
could focus more on the relative merits of the initiative. Then, after
passage, the legislature could choose to amend the law or, after two
years, repeal it. The supreme court’s decision in Alaska Action Center was
therefore incorrect.201
Two other decisions are worth discussing because they also present
important issues. First, McAlpine confronts the issue of how the
proposed test affects initiatives that deal with money. This issue is
primarily resolved by applying the principle previously discussed
regarding how to categorize money.202 Under this approach, McAlpine
appears to be correctly decided. The second sentence was correctly
invalidated203 because, by specifically defining the amount of money to
be spent, the legislature was permanently robbed of its discretion over
that money. On the other hand, the third sentence was correctly allowed
to go to the voters204 because it merely required that the legislature
create a separate community college department,205 leaving the
legislature with discretion over that money because it could repeal the
statute after two years.
Pullen is also correctly decided under the proposed test, although it
is a much closer call. The salmon at issue are the salmon from that year,
and no later reversal by the legislature would ever get those salmon

201. On the other hand, Staudenmaier is clearly correct, since the initiative
would have required the legislature to sell the power company for a determined
price, thus severing the tie between the state and the asset permanently.
Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage, 139 P.3d 1259, 1262–63 (Alaska
2006).
202. See supra Part III.A.
203. McAlpine, 762 P.2d at 91.
204. Id. at 93.
205. Id.
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back, short of raiding freezers and shelves.206 Additionally, the court is
right that in times of shortage the state would be required to meet the
five percent guarantee.207 Reading Pullen, however, one is left with an
uneasy feeling that something is wrong with the court’s analysis even if
the decision is technically correct. This result is partially because the
initiative itself does not discuss shortages and the court’s preoccupation
with this issue makes one wonder how the initiative would work when
there is no shortage of salmon. It therefore appears that the court was
stretching to find an appropriation in an initiative that, in most years,
would not constitute one. Thus, Pullen, unlike Alaska Action Center, is not
an incorrect decision, but should rather be considered the outer limits of
the appropriation prohibition. The courts, however, should be wary of
extending those limits any further.
C.

Conclusion

With several minor adjustments, the current test could be vastly
improved to better reflect the entire initiative process envisioned by the
framers of the Alaska Constitution. The proposed test will, of course, not
provide easy answers for every possible initiative because these issues
are rarely cut and dry. Instead, the proposed test provides a usable
framework that would assist judges and practitioners who confront this
confusing area of the law, while simultaneously improving the
constitutionally-created interaction between citizens and the legislature.

VI. IS CLEAN WATER I AN APPROPRIATION?
This Part will analyze whether Clean Water I would be considered
an appropriation under both the current test and the proposed test
described above. Under the current test, the court would have likely
decided that Clean Water I would have been an appropriation; under
the proposed test, however, it would not have been found to be an
appropriation because, although the initiative would have severely
restricted the legislature’s discretion in the short run, the legislature
would ultimately retain control over the assets.208

206. See Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 63–64 (Alaska 1996).
207. Id.
208. This section does not include a discussion of the constitutionality of
Clean Water III because, since the proposed test is more inclusive than the
current test, all initiatives that qualify under the current tests will almost
certainly also qualify under the proposed test. Additionally, Clean Water III, by
merely proposing additional and not even particularly burdensome regulations,
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A. Clean Water I Deals with a State Asset Under Either Test
First, under both tests, Clean Water I deals with state assets. The
initiative confronts fears of injury to people and salmon by regulating
the amount of waste allowed to enter the water.209 The state assets in this
situation are the water, because the initiative prevents pollution, and the
salmon, because salmon are the beneficiaries of the initiative. As with
Pullen, both of these are public goods and would therefore be considered
state assets under the current test.210 The proposed test would also have
little problem declaring the fish and water state assets because the
initiative directly deals with the quality of the water and is for the direct
benefit of the salmon. The distinction between both tests, therefore, is
not particularly important to determine what state assets are involved
here because of the initiative’s clarity. The two tests, however, might
diverge in categorizing the specific state asset involved. The original test
might view the individual salmon as benefitting from the initiative as
the assets at issue, which might affect the permanence evaluation in the
later part of the test. In contrast, the proposed test would make clear that
the state asset affected is the salmon population in general because that
is the sponsors’ apparent concern.
B.

Clean Water I Would Likely Not Be Considered a Giveaway
Under Either Test

Next, it is unlikely that Clean Water I would be considered a
giveaway under either test, although there is a possibility that a radical
reading of Pullen would allow for the original test to find a giveaway.
The initiative is, at the very least, not the explicit type of giveaway
condemned in Bailey because citizens are not being asked whether they
want to give themselves a gift.211 What, though, do citizens get if they
vote for the initiative? In a sense, they get the guarantee that the salmon
industry will survive and are allowed to vent their frustration towards,
and disapproval of, Pebble Mine.212 This situation is clearly not a
does not implicate the larger issues regarding the use initiatives that animate
Clean Water I.
209. See Review of 07WATR Initiative Application, Office of the Attorney
General of Alaska, 2007 Alas. AG LEXIS 10, *1–4 (Alaska June 21, 2007).
210. See Pullen, 923 P.2d at 59.
211. Conversely, an initiative that, for example, dealt with this issue by giving
everyone a percentage share in the income from the mine or the salmon industry
would almost certainly be a giveaway.
212. The author is not attempting to argue that the opponents of Pebble Mine
are correct in their scientific assertions but is rather hypothesizing what may
cause a citizen to vote for the initiative.
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giveaway because citizens are not gaining any material benefit; instead,
they are acting from ideological or policy motivations, not rash selfinterest.
The motivations of the salmon industry in supporting the initiative
are more of an issue. As Pullen suggested, many people in Alaska are
involved in salmon fishing, ranging from large-scale commercial fishers
to occasional recreational fishers.213 In fact, the proponents of the
initiatives emphasize just how important the salmon industry is to
Alaska.214 Some people, especially those with considerable financial
interests in the salmon industry, may support the initiative because, by
securing the health of the salmon population, they may directly benefit
from the initiative. The two tests might reach somewhat different results
here. In Pullen, a giveaway was found because the initiative was said to
appeal to the self-interest of non-commercial fishers.215 Though neither
trial court did so, this logic could be further applied to the Clean Water
Initiative because it does appeal to the self-interest of those involved in
the salmon industry.
This application would be wrong for the same reasons that Pullen’s
finding of a giveaway was incorrect. First, not all Alaskans would
benefit from this initiative because many Alaskans have no involvement
with the salmon industry and many possible supporters are likely
motivated by ideological and environmental reasons. Second, the benefit
itself is far from certain because no one is guaranteed to gain anything
since the initiative is neither giving away nor otherwise guaranteeing a
certain amount of salmon. Additionally, opponents of the initiatives
who stand to benefit from Pebble Mine will also vote out of their selfinterest, meaning that the initiative deals with competing material
interests and is not a giveaway.
C.

The Analysis for the Second Purpose Varies Greatly Depending
on the Test Used

Finally, the analysis of Clean Water I under the second purpose
clearly shows the significant differences between the two tests. Under
the current test, interference with the legislature’s discretion occurs
when an initiative “set[s] aside a certain specified amount of money or
property for a specific purpose or object in a manner that is executable,

213. See Pullen, 923 P.2d at 63–64.
214. See, e.g., Parker et al., supra note 29, at 6–9.
215. See Pullen, 923 P.2d at 63.
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mandatory and reasonably definite with no further legislative action,”216
while under the proposed test, the standard is altered to only affect
initiatives that permanently rob the legislature of its discretion.
Under the current test, Clean Water I would likely be found to
interfere with the legislature’s discretion because, by essentially being a
ban, the initiative decides the distribution of state assets among the
competing mining and salmon fishing interests. The legislature would
therefore be robbed of any discretion regarding whether or not Pebble
Mine should exist or what the conditions of its existence should be.
Finding that the initiative interferes with the legislature’s discretion
would expand the current doctrine because the initiative merely
prevents one situation from occurring, rather than dictating exactly
what should occur.217 However, the extension seems logical under the
current test because of the clear interference with the legislature’s
discretion regarding the mine, water, and salmon. Additionally, by not
allowing mining, the initiative essentially requires that salmon fishing
be the paramount use of Bristol Bay and therefore tells the legislature
what it must do with an asset. Furthermore, there does not appear to be
any instruction from the supreme court that would limit the reach of the
prohibition in situations such as this one.
On the other hand, under the proposed test, the initiative would
not be considered an appropriation because the initiative does not
permanently change anything. The initiative creates a new and more
burdensome regulation on mines that will effectively prevent large-scale
mines such as Pebble from operating. Though this is a significant act, the
legislature retains the power to overturn the initiative in two years.
Thus, the initiative serves merely as a check on the development of
Pebble Mine, not a complete ban. Additionally, the legislature remains
free to enact similar legislation that could assuage the concerns of the
initiative’s supporters while still allowing the mine to be developed.
This distinction is important because Clean Water I is a much stronger
initiative than Clean Water III and more directly opposes the
development of Pebble Mine, while Clean Water III merely expresses the
desire that Pebble be developed in an environmentally safe manner.
Though Clean Water III may have had a greater chance of gaining
popular support due to its relative moderation, this is a decision for the

216. See Staudenmaier v. Municipality of Anchorage, 139 P.3d 1259, 1262
(Alaska 2006).
217. This is the distinction raised by the Dillingham court which approved
Clean Water I. See Holman v. Parnell, No. 3DI-07-56, 16–17 (Alaska Super. Ct.
Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.ltgov.state.ak.us/PDFs/07WATRSummaryJudgment.pdf.
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voters, not the courts, and the sponsors should have had the
opportunity to present the clearest expression of their views.

CONCLUSION
The struggle over the Clean Water Initiatives has exposed a
problem that goes even deeper than Pebble Mine and involves the
power of Alaskans to enact meaningful and important legislation
through the ballot initiative process. That this power should have limits
is beyond debate. The contours of those limits, however, are extremely
important in preserving the dynamic relationship between the citizenry
and the legislature envisioned by the framers of the Alaska Constitution.
In recent years, the supreme court has regrettably expanded the
prohibition on appropriations in a way that disrupts this relationship
and threatens to limit the use of the initiative process to confront the
important issues facing Alaska.
There is a way out of this problem that keeps intact much of the
supreme court’s jurisprudence, but which, by finding appropriations
only in situations that permanently rob the legislature of its discretion,
fully acknowledges both the powers and limits of the ballot initiative. In
its most recent opinions, the supreme court has acknowledged that its
earlier opinions may be read too broadly in restricting initiatives. By
adopting the proposed test, the court would continue upon this path
and create an approach that allows for citizens to more fully express
their constitutional right to sponsor ballot initiatives. Although this
change may not affect Pebble Mine, there is hope that it will allow for
greater citizen participation in the next major issue that confronts
Alaskans.

